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State-Interest Analysis and the Channeling 
Function in Privacy Law 
Carl E. Schneider 
Introduction 
In this article, I wish to criticize the narrowness of the Supreme Court's 
conception of the interests states may advance to justify statutes challenged 
on constitutional privacy grounds. I also wish to identify and describe one 
of the several state interests that not infrequently undergirds such legislation 
but that the Court has failed to understand. 
My argument must begin with some ideas I first advanced in an article 
on "State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth Amendment 'Privacy' Law: An 
Essay on the Constitutionalization of Social lssues."1 There I observed that 
while courts and commentators have lavished effort on the fundamental-
rights side of privacy law, they have scanted the state-interest side, thereby 
producing crucial weaknesses in that law. Some of these weaknesses are 
doctrinal: The Supreme Court has neither articulated a standard to use in 
Fourteenth Amendment privacy cases, adequately defined the terms (e.g., 
"necessary" and "compelling") of the standard it most often invokes, nor 
effectively applied that standard to the relevant empirical questions. These 
weaknesses bespeak "the Court's unwillingness or inability to decide what 
it meant to do when it began to constitutionalize family law, the difficulties 
of setting coherent yet reasonably simple and workable judicial policy in 
an area as multifarious as family law and in a country as various as ours, 
and the problems with assessing the desirability and effectiveness of legisla-
tion in family law."2 
In addition, "the Court often looks at the challenged statute in isolation 
from its legal and social context and often looks at the challenged statute 
in isolation from other statutes and from other forms of social regulation."3 
Such laws may sometimes "be understood as attempting to influence behav-
ior indirectly, by reinforcing in people attitudes that encourage restraint in 
family and sexual settings. They may seek to induce what we might, loosely 
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and perhaps hyperbolically, call 'ascetic' attitudes toward family and sexual 
life."4 This "socializing strategy," while hardly obligatory social policy, 
has substantial foundations in Western thought and should be considered 
when courts evaluate state interests. Finally, I speculated that the laws re-
viewed in privacy cases may be "intended to help construct and sustain 
social institutions for the conduct of sexual and family life,"5 institutions 
that not only serve weighty social ends, but may even augment individual 
autonomy. 
In my earlier article, then, I argued that constitutional analysis in pri-
vacy law needs to see statutes in their full "legal and social context," to 
appreciate the true complexity of the world.6 And I argued that the socializ-
ing strategy is sometimes part of that context and complexity. Here, I assess 
another such element by examining the law's work in recruiting, building, 
shaping, and sustaining social institutions. Briefly, I suggest that that 
work-which I call the "channeling function"-may be part of a state's 
interest in statutes challenged on privacy grounds.7 I do not argue that the 
channeling function will always be present or that it must always prevail. 
I do argue that it is an often ignored but sometimes legitimate aspect of 
a statute's goals and a state's interests. 
My purpose here may be explained somewhat differently. The right 
of privacy is "fundamental." Courts and commentators accord it notable 
power, for it vanquishes all but those "compelling" state interests to whose 
service a statute is "necessary." Few interests attain the beatitude of compul-
sion or necessity. Reading some opinions, one wonders how any statute 
could survive. Virtually all family law (the area most often at issue in 
privacy cases) seems at risk.8 How has it endured? A clue may lie in a 
lurking, inarticulate judicial intuition that there is more to the state's inter-
ests than the Court has yet acknowledged, that those interests are subtler, 
richer, and hardier than the Court's formulas can recognize. This article 
seeks to confirm that intuition by restoring one more piece to the neglected 
mosaic of state interests. 
My exploration of this topic will have several stages. First, I will 
define what I mean by "channeling function" and suggest that, rightly or 
wrongly, it has played a weighty role in family law and is thus sometimes 
part of the interests a state promotes through its statute law. In the second 
stage of my paper I will examine some of the factors that constrain the 
channeling function's effectiveness and may make it more vulnerable to 
constitutional attack. I will try to show that the function's power is limited, 
that that power may be used both wisely and foolishly, and that its use 
imposes costs. Finally, I will seek to make my discussion of the channeling 
function as a state interest more concrete by exploring a recent case 
(Michael H. v. Gerald D.) in channeling terms. 
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Finally, a word about this article's scope. One might ask two basic 
questions about the channeling function. First, is its use wise social policy? 
Second, may it properly be adduced as a state interest to justify a law 
challenged on privacy grounds? I address only the second question and 
leave the former to another time and place. 
The Theory of the Channeling Function 
What Is the Channeling Function? 
Family law has, I think, five functions.9 The first is the protective function. 
One of law's most basic duties is to protect citizens against harms done 
to them by other citizens. This means protecting people from physical harm, 
as the law of spouse and child abuse attempts to do, and from nonphysical 
harms, especially economic wrongs and psychological injuries. 10 Law's sec-
ond function is to help people organize their lives and affairs in the ways 
they prefer. Family law performs this "facilitative" function by offering 
people the law's services in entering and enforcing contracts, by giving 
legal effect to their private arrangements. Family law's third function is 
to help people resolve disputes. The law of divorce exemplifies family 
law's "arbitral" function, since today's divorce courts primarily adjudicate 
conflicting claims to marital property, alimony, and child custody. 
Instinct in each of these first three functions of family law lies a 
relatively commonplace idea: There are people (particularly children) the 
law is widely expected to protect, contracts it is widely expected to facili-
tate, and disputes it is widely expected to arbitrate. However, the last two 
functions of family law are less self-evident and more controversial. The 
first of these is the expressive function. It works by deploying the law's 
power to impart ideas through words · and symbols. It has two (related) 
aspects: Law's expressive abilities may be used (first) to provide a voice 
in which citizens may speak and (second) to alter the behavior of people 
the law addresses. 11 The ERA exemplifies both aspects. Its proponents had 
(among other things) two kinds of expressive purposes in mind. They pro-
posed it partly because they wanted the law of their country-their law-to 
make a symbolic statement about the relationship between men and women. 
And they also believed that such symbolic statements can promote changes 
in social sentiment that in turn may promote a reformation of social behav-
ior. 
Finally, in the channeling function the law creates or (more often) 
supports social institutions that are thought to serve desirable ends. "Social 
institution" I intend broadly: "In its formal sociological definition, an institu-
tion is a pattern of expected action of individuals or groups enforced by 
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social sanctions, both positive and negative."12 Social institutions arise, Ber-
ger and Ludemann tell us, "whenever there is a reciprocal typification of 
habitualized actions by types of actors."13 Generally, the channeling function 
does not require that people use these social institutions, although it may 
offer incentives and disincentives for their use. Primarily, rather, it is their 
very presence, the social currency they have, and the governmental support 
they receive that combine to make it seem reasonable and even natural for 
people to use them. Thus people can be said to be channeled into them. 
As Berger and Luckmann write, "Institutions ... , by the very fact of their 
existence, control human conduct by setting up predefined patterns of con-
duct, which channel it in one direction as against the many other directions 
that would theoretically be possible."14 Or as James Fitzjames Stephen wrote 
with characteristic vividness, "The life of the great mass of men, to a great 
extent the life of all men, is like a watercourse guided this way or that 
by a system of dams, sluices, weirs, and embankments .... [I]t is by these 
works, that is to say, by their various customs and institutions-that men's 
lives are regulated."15 
Business law offers usefully clear examples of such institutions. People 
have long united to invest in and run businesses. To encourage such activity, 
governments give legal recognition to a particular business form-the corpo-
ration. They also endow it with special advantages-particularly, limited 
liability and unlimited life. By now, this form has become familiar, natural, 
and comfortable. It is habitualized, it is institutionalized. 
I have used the example of business institutions because the law's 
role in forming and supporting them and channeling people into them is 
particularly evident. In addition, it is probably easier for us to appreciate 
the channeling function in the relatively uncontroversial context of business 
life. But with what institutions have statutes challenged under "privacy" 
rubrics been concerned? Here we encounter some difficulty. It must always 
be hard to define any social institution. "Society" has no voice in which 
to identify and describe its institutions. Lawmakers do not always speak 
explicitly and exactly about social institutions, even though they may be 
much concerned for them. Different people would define the same insti-
tution in different ways, and the same institution will affect different people 
differently. What is more, institutional patterns in a modern society will 
necessarily be elaborately complex: Any institution will have both norma-
tive and behavioral aspects, and behavior within institutions will rarely live 
up to the institution's normative aspirations. One institution may take many 
forms, forms that can, further, vary from place to place and can change 
over time. A single institution can serve competing functions. 16 Few if any 
institutions will be unambivalently and unambiguously embraced, and the 
multiplicity of social goals may interfere with the nurture of the most 
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warmly embraced institution. An institution may encounter competing and 
even conflicting institutions. 17 And, worse, there is a sense in which institu-
tions do not "exist," but are merely analytic constructs. 18 
None of this, however, makes it pointless to talk about social institu-
tions. Institutions may be analytic constructs, but those constructs can still 
be useful attempts to describe patterns of attitudes and behavior. That those 
patterns will always be complex and those attempts will always be imprecise 
does not mean that the patterns are not there or that the attempts will be 
useless. 
One other point about the channeling function needs to be made before 
we explore specific examples of its use in state-interest analysis. In one 
important (if limited) sense, the channeling function is normatively neutral: 
It can be employed to serve all kinds of normative ends. It has been put 
to many uses; it could be put to many more. Central to any evaluation of 
a specific example of the channeling function will be an assessment of the 
particular goals to which it has been put. To illustrate the workings of the 
function in privacy cases, I have selected two institutions that I think the 
law can plausibly be said to use in channeling terms. But there are certainly 
other ways in which the channeling function has been deployed in family 
law, and there may well be ways in which it would be better deployed. 
Having acknowledged the difficulty and asserted the importance of 
my enterprise, I will now try to describe two broad social institutions that 
a state could regard as objects of the channeling function. 19 These two 
institutions are "marriage" and "parenthood." These are, obviously, quite 
broadly defined institutions, and my descriptions of them are thus subject 
to all the difficulties I described above. I have no doubt that both these 
institutions have somewhat different meanings for different people, that 
they have changed over time and are still changing, and that they do not 
monopolize intimate life in modem America. However, a state defending 
a statute against constitutional attack might plausibly identify a core of 
ideas that have enough social support to justify the term "institution" and 
that the state might conclude the law should try to support, to shape, and 
to channel people into. 
A state might, then, posit a normative model of "marriage" with several 
fundamental characteristics. It is monogamous, heterosexual, and permanent. 
It rests on love. Husbands and wives are to treat each other affectionately, 
considerately, and fairly. They should be animated by mutual concern and 
willing to sacrifice for each other. In short, they ought to assent to the old 
question: "Wilt thou love her, comfort her, honour, and keep her in sickness 
and in health; and, forsaking all others, keep thee only unto her, so long 
as ye both shall live?"20 
Of course, as Karl Llewellyn warned, too much can be "thought and 
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written as if we had a pattern of ways that ma[k]e up marriage."21 Of 
course, as Llewellyn knew, "'The' norm is none too uniform."22 But as 
he also knew, "major features are observed, are 'recognized,' are made the 
measure of the 'right.' Right in such matters is most powerfully felt: these 
are compacted patterns, backed by unreasoning tradition, built around inter-
ests that lie deep and close."23 
In the same way, a state might posit an institution of "parenthood" 
with several key normative characteristics. Parents should be married to 
each other. They are preferably the biological father and mother of their 
child. They have authority over their children and can make decisions for 
them. However, like spouses, parents are expected to love their children 
and to be affectionate, considerate, and fair. They should support and nurture 
their children during their minority. They should assure them a stable home, 
particularly by staying married to each other, so that the child lives with 
both parents and knows the comforts of security. 
Obviously, these two normative models are not and never were descrip-
tions of any universal empirical reality, and I will soon examine recent 
changes in social practice that might affect them. Nor are they the only 
models the channeling function might be recruited to serve. Nevertheless, 
they do describe ideals that have won substantial allegiance in American 
life and law. I will thus use these models to illustrate how the channeling 
function can work. How, then, might a state argue that its law supports 
these two institutions and channels people into them? 
A state might see family law as setting a framework of rules one of 
whose effects is to shape, sponsor, and sustain the model of marriage I 
described above: It writes standards for entry into marriage, standards that 
prohibit polygamous, incestuous, and homosexual unions. It seeks to en-
courage marital stability by inhibiting divorce (although it seeks this goal 
much less vigorously than it once did). It tries to improve marital behavior 
both directly and indirectly: It imposes a few direct obligations during 
marriage, like the duty of support. Less directly, it has invented special 
categories of property (like tenancies by the entirety and rights of dower 
and curtesy) to reflect and reinforce the special relationship of marriage. 
It indirectly sets some standards for marital behavior through the law of 
divorce. Fault-based divorce does so by describing behavior so egregious 
that it justifies divorce. Marital-property law implicitly sets standards for 
the financial conduct of spouses. Finally, prohibitions against nonmarital 
sexual activity and against quasi-marital arrangements in principle confine 
sexual life to marriage. "What is all this," James Fitzjames Stephen emphati-
cally asked, "except the expression of the strongest possible determination 
on the part of the Legislature to recognize, maintain, and favour marriage 
in every possible manner as the foundation of civilized society?"24 
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Similarly, a state might argue that a framework of laws molds and 
promotes the institution of parenthood. Laws criminalizing fornication, co-
habitation, adultery, and bigamy in principle limit parenthood to married 
couples, and those legal disadvantages that still attach to illegitimacy make 
it wise to confine parenthood to marriage. Laws restricting divorce make 
it likelier that a child would be raised by both parents. The law buttresses 
parents' authority over children. Parents may use reasonable force in disci-
plining their children. They may decide whether their children should have 
medical treatment. They may choose their child's school. Parents of "chil-
dren in need of supervision" can summon up the state's coercive power. 
However, the law also tries, directly and indirectly, to shape parental behav-
ior. It requires parents to support their children. It penalizes the "abuse" 
or "neglect" of children and obliges many kinds of people to report evidence 
of it. It makes parents send their children to school. Custody law obliquely 
sets standards for parental behavior and emphasizes the primacy of chil-
dren's interests. Finally, some states further elaborate the relationship be-
tween parent and child by obliging adult children to support their indigent 
parents. 
This sketch suggests how the law can be seen as performing the first 
task of the channeling function, namely, to create-or more often, to re-
cruit-social institutions and to mold and sustain them. The function's sec-
ond task is to channel people into institutions. It can perform these two 
tasks in several ways. First, it does so simply by recognizing and endorsing 
institutions, thus giving them some aura of legitimacy and permanence. 
Recognition may be extended, for instance, through formalized, routinized, 
and regulated entry and exit to an institution, as with marriage: "By the 
authority vested in me by the State of Michigan, I now pronounce you 
man and wife." 
A second channeling technique is to reward participation in an institu-
tion. Tax law, for instance, may offer advantages-like the marital deduc-
tion-to married couples that it denies the unmarried. Similarly, Social 
Security offers spouses benefits it refuses lovers. These advantages are en-
hanced when private entities consult the legal institution in allocating 
benefits, as when private employers offer medical insurance only to "family 
members" as the law defines that term. In a somewhat different vein, the 
law of alimony and marital property offers spouses-but generally not "co-
habitants"-protections on divorce. 
Third, the law can channel by disfavoring competing institutions. 
Sometimes competitors are flatly outlawed, as by laws prohibiting sodomy, 
bigamy, adultery, and prostitution. Bans on fornication and cohabitation 
mean (in principle) that, to have sexual relations, one must marry. Some-
times competing institutions are merely disadvantaged. For instance, the 
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rule making contracts for meretricious consideration unenforceable tradition-
ally denied unmarried couples the law's help in resolving some disputes. 
Similarly, nonparents are presumptively disadvantaged in custody disputes 
with parents.25 Finally, restrictive divorce laws impede reentry to the alterna-
tive institution of singleness. 
Fourth, in principle people can be channeled into an institution by 
directly penalizing its nonuse. One might, for instance, say that school 
taxes penalize childlessness, since nonparents get a good deal less out of 
those taxes than parents. However, the weakness of this example suggests 
the difficulty of finding really good instances in American law of direct 
penalties for not marrying or not having children. 
By and large, then, the channeling function does not primarily use 
direct legal coercion. People are not forced to marry. One can contract out 
(formally or informally) of many of the rules underlying marriage. One 
need not have children, and one is not forced to treat them lovingly. Rather, 
the function forms and reinforces institutions that have significant social 
support and that, optimally, come to seem so natural that people use them 
almost unreflectively. It relies centrally but not exclusively on social ap-
proval of the institution, on social rewards for its use, and on social disfavor 
of its alternatives. Some aspects of it may be highly legalized, as divorce 
is. Some alternatives may, at least formally, be legally prohibited. The law 
may buttress an institution here and harry its competitors there. But, Berger 
and Luckmann explain, "(T]he primary social control is given in the exis-
tence of an institution as such .... Additional control mechanisms are re-
quired only insofar as the processes of institutionalization are less than 
completely successful."26 They suggest "institutions are there, external to 
[the individual], persistent in their reality .... They have coercive power 
over him, both in themselves, by the sheer force of their facticity, and 
through the control mechanisms that are usually attached to the most impor-
tant of them."27 And as Llewellyn, thinking more particularly about mar-
riage, wrote, "One vital element in the fact-pattern thus made right is (this 
needs repetition) its recognition by the group .... [O]nce conceived, once 
accepted, the over-simple norm-concept maintains itself stubbornly, despite 
all changes in conditions; it becomes the socially given, right, ideal-type 
of 'marriage': the connubium honestum of the vir honestus."28 Channeling's 
reliance on social institutions, then, is both its strength and its weakness. 
What Purposes Does the Channeling Function Serve? 
The channeling function, I have said, fosters social institutions and channels 
people into them. But why might the state want to do so? To answer that 
question, let us revisit the example of the corporation as a "channeling" 
State-Interest Analysis and the Channeling Factor 105 
institution. First, the corporation serves law's three core functions. For ex-
ample, it serves the protective function by allowing people to invest in 
enterprises without risking their whole fortunes, by protecting minority 
shareholders, and by directing economic activity into an institution whose 
public nature makes it easier to regulate. The corporation serves the facilita-
tive function by giving people a convenient and efficient way of organizing 
themselves into enterprises. It serves the arbitral function by providing 
mechanisms for resolving disputes among entrepreneurs and for winding 
up their affairs. 
But the corporate form does more than promote law's core functions. 
More centrally and obviously, it serves some broad social purposes. Primar-
ily, it promotes the accumulation of large agglomerations of capital and 
the organization of many people into a single enterprise. In other words, 
the corporate form makes possible the extensive and complex economic 
institutions on which rest industrialization, social wealth, and modernity. 
Less grandly, more specifically, and more subtly, the corporation serves 
what might be called "efficiency" functions. For instance, it relieves pro-
spective entrepreneurs of the need to figure out de novo how to organize 
their venture. Much of that work will already have been done by earlier 
generations and been embodied in the corporate form and in the law, litera-
ture, and lore that surround it. Because that form is neither monolithic nor 
exclusive, entrepreneurs will have important choices to make (and consider-
able flexibility). But the energy they must expend is diminished by the 
menu of well-developed standard alternatives among which to choose. 
In addition, the corporate form makes the world more predictable for 
everyone. When investors, regulators, employees, creditors, debtors, ven-
dors, and customers encounter a corporation, they essentially know how it 
is organized and what it can and cannot do. A creditor, for example, realizes 
that, unlike a partnership, a corporation's liability is limited to its own 
assets. And so on. Because people have established expectations about cor-
porations they need expend less effort to understand an enterprise. This 
not only saves them time and trouble, but may make them more willing 
to join in or deal with the enterprise. In short, both the corporation and 
those who deal with it benefit from the existence of a well-known, time-
tested, socially accepted, and governmentally supported economic institu-
tion. 
Similarly, family law's channeling function is partly a specialized way 
of performing its protective, facilitative, and arbitral functions. For instance, 
marriage variously serves the protective function. Law does not just (in 
conjunction with other social forces) create a shell of an institution; it 
builds (again with much help) institutions with norms. The institution of 
marriage that the law recruits and shapes attempts to induce in spouses a 
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sense of an obligation to treat each other well-to love and honor each 
other. At the elemental level of physical violence, the law has tried to 
reinforce this socially imposed obligation by making cruelty a ground for 
divorce, by taking cruelty into account in settling the spouses' economic 
affairs, and by criminalizing and (increasingly aggressively in some jurisdic-
tions) prosecuting spouse abuse. At the level of economic life, the law has 
(at least nominally) supervised the fairness of antenuptial agreements and 
the distribution of the spouses' assets on divorce. And marriage protects 
children by making it likelier that both parents will care for them throughout 
their minority.29 
The channeling function also assists the facilitative function. The latter 
function furnishes people mechanisms that help them organize their lives 
and affairs as they wish. Family law's institutions offer people models for 
organizing their lives. These models have been developed over time and 
have presumably worked for many other people. They become part of a 
menu of social choice. Further, marriage offers people a kind of relationship 
with social and legal advantages that are primarily available precisely be-
cause the law gives marriage a special status. Finally, marriage serves the 
dispute-resolution function by providing rules and a forum in which to 
adjudicate the disputes that flock around divorce like remoras around a 
shark. In addition, it provides norms of behavior that may help the parties 
resolve some of their disputes privately. 
But the channeling function is more than a specialized means of per-
forming law's other functions. Like the corporation, marriage and parent-
hood serve some broad social purposes. These are crucial, but they are 
also so familiar they hardly need elaboration. Sixty years ago Karl Llewellyn 
discerned twelve such purposes in marriage. They included the regulation 
of sexual behavior, the reduction of sexual conflict, the orderly perpetuation 
of the species, the "building and reinforcement of an economic unit," the 
regulation of wealth, and the "development of individual personality."30 
And a large body of writing argues that the present happiness and future 
well-being of children depend on their growing up in something like the 
kind of institution I described above.31 
Less grandly, more specifically, and more interestingly, the institutions 
of the family also serve what I earlier called "efficiency" functions (but 
that might in this warmer context be called ways of easing social life). 
First, channeling's institutions spare people having to invent the forms of 
family life de novo. Imagine two nineteen-year-olds living in a state of 
nature who find themselves in love. Without established social institutions, 
they would have to work out afresh how to express that love, how to 
structure their relationship, and what to expect of each other. The same 
couple in, say, the United States of the mid-twentieth century would find 
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a set of answers to those questions in the institution of marriage. To be 
sure, they would see other answers presented by other institutions. They 
would hear criticisms of marriage. They would not be compelled to marry. 
But, marriage would seem natural to them because most of the adults they 
knew partook of it, because society and the law supported it, and because 
they had to some extent internalized its values. As one sociologist remarks, 
"When people make decisions, they tend to look not to a mathematical 
formula to determine what is to their best advantage, but to what others 
do, to what they have traditionally done, or to what they think others think 
they ought to do."32 The institution, that is, would be part of a comfortable 
social vocabulary, a vocabulary that would save our lovers from having 
to invent their own language. 
In short, as Berger and Luckmann observe, "Habitualization carries 
with it the important psychological gain that choices are narrowed."33 As 
Whitehead memorably put it, 
It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copy-books and 
by eminent people when they are making speeches, that we should 
cultivate the habit of thinking of what we are doing. The precise oppo-
site is the case. Civilization advances by extending the number of 
important operations which we can perform without thinking about 
them. Operations of thought are likely cavalry charges in a battle-they 
are strictly limited in number, they require fresh horses, and must 
only be made at decisive moments.34 
Of course, this is not to say that cavalry charges are never necessary, that 
operations of thought are always to be avoided. Quite the contrary. As 
Berger and Luckmann note, "[B]y providing a stable background in which 
human activity may proceed with a minimum of decision-making most of 
the time, [habitualization] frees energy for such decisions as may be neces-
sary on certain occasions. In other words, the background of habitualized 
activity opens up a foreground for deliberation and innovation."35 
The channeling function does not just relieve people of the burden 
of working out afresh how to organize their lives. Even if one could satisfac-
torily invent modes of living for oneself, they probably could not be lived 
alone but would have to be lived with others. People need to understand 
and predict what other people think and do so that they can readily and 
safely deal and cooperate with each other. Social institutions help serve 
that need. As Martin Krygier writes, "There are many social situations 
where our decisions are strategically interdependent [ with the decisions of 
other people. l]n such situations, norms will be generated which provide 
'some anchorage; some preeminently conspicuous indication as to what 
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action is likely to be taken by (most of) the others.' "36 Social institutions 
and the norms they embody, then, help us count on, cope with, and cooper-
ate with other people. 
More concretely, for example, the institution of marriage helps people 
to plan for the future even before becoming engaged and to reach easier 
understandings with their fiances and spouses about their married lives. 
People dealing with married couples benefit as well. Mundanely, they know 
that when they say, "Can you come for dinner on the sixteenth?" the invita-
tion will be taken as including both husband and wife. Less banally and 
more consequentially, a wedding ring warns anyone attracted to its wearer 
not to contemplate an intimate relationship. 
The kind of "anchorage" of which Krygier speaks may in fact be 
particularly important in family relationships, for in the complex and long-
term intimate relationships that characterize family life reliance and trust 
are specially needed. A central source of that reliance and trust is of course 
a faith in the love and steadfastness of one's family members. But that 
faith may be more comfortably sustained, and reciprocating love more easily 
given, where personal feelings are reinforced (and known to be reinforced) 
by social institutions. As Norval Glenn suggests, even people "who still 
strongly adhere to the ideal of marital permanence may be afraid to commit 
strongly to their marriages if they perceive a general weakening of the 
ideal."37 
The advantages of institutions in family life are illuminated by situ-
ations in which institutions are absent. Andrew Cherlin, for instance, de-
scribes the difficulties for remarried adults and their children whose "day 
to day life includes many problems for which there are no institutionalized 
solutions. These problems can range from deciding what a stepchild should 
call his or her stepparent, to resolving the sexual tensions that can emerge 
between step-relatives in the absence of a well-defined incest taboo, to 
defining the financial obligations of husbands to their spouses and children 
from current and previous marriages."38 Nor are these institutional weak-
nesses easily overcome. David Chambers writes that "the relationship be-
tween many stepparents and stepchildren remains unclear and uncomfortable 
well beyond the initial stages."39 Indeed, Cherlin argues that "the higher 
divorce rate for remarriages after divorce is a consequence of the incomplete 
institutionalization of remarriage after divorce in our society."40 He notes 
that because institutionalized solutions for the special problems of reconsti-
tuted families have not emerged, "there is more opportunity for disagree-
ments and divisions among family members and more strain in many remar-
riages after divorce."41 
We can summarize these workings of the channeling function by imag-
ining two people looking for recreation, who live in a world without tennis, 
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and who are given three balls, two rackets, and one net. They could no 
doubt find some way of amusing themselves with these toys. But tennis 
is a good game partly because it developed over many centuries, and our 
couple could not easily invent as good a game. Further, where tennis is a 
social institution, the two will readily find people with whom to enjoy 
their recreation, to improve their game, to relish their successes, and to 
lament their failures. And part of the pleasure of tennis lies in knowing its 
past glories and following its current progress. Tennis, in other words, 
succeeds because it is a shared and well-established social institution. Mar-
riage and parenthood benefit from that same fact. 
Let me conclude what I have said in this section by calling again on 
Karl Llewellyn, who wrote, 
Such are the functions of the social institution, in our civilization. 
Little about the set-up is inevitable. Costs which go here unnoted are 
bitterly high. In no point is the institution adequate in performance, 
nor is it always the major factor in such performance as obtains. Any 
one of the functions could be, at some time or place has been, is now 
in part, served powerfully in other ways. Few indeed are the cases in 
which marriage alone is halfway adequate to any of them .... But 
would one for that deny vitality to the work ... which marriage does?42 
Some Limitations of the Channeling Function 
So far in this study, we have examined the way the channeling function 
works and the purposes it serves. We now need to explore the channeling 
function's limitations. We will thus ask what factors may constrain the 
function's utility and what costs its use may impose. 
Before beginning this investigation of the channeling function's limits, 
however, I must stress that I have not argued that every invocation of the 
channeling function should suffice to justify a challenged statute. The func-
tion's appropriateness and efficacy will vary from case to case. Sometimes, 
it may be directly implicated and reasonably effective. In other cases, a 
statute may contribute little to channeling or may channel ineffectively. 
Indeed, I would argue that the function's overall constitutional status 
cannot be established with precision. This is primarily because of weak-
nesses in the structure of state-interest analysis as the Court has practiced 
it. First, as I suggested in my earlier article, the Court has not taken its 
own formulas very seriously. (And those formulas may well change as the 
Court continues its reexamination of the privacy doctrine.) Second, as I 
also argued in my earlier article, those formulae are in any event clumsy 
and unhelpful. Third, both my prior article and this one rest partly on a 
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skepticism that the Constitution contains the privacy right the Court has 
discovered in it. In my earlier article, this skepticism freed me to suggest 
that constitutionalizing social issues requires courts to make some kinds 
of social decisions that they are poorly equipped to handle. At least without 
more helpful guidance from the Constitution, evaluating the channeling 
function seems to me such a decision. 
In short, it seems to me more useful to study the channeling function 
than to struggle across the arid desert of the Court's state-interest analysis 
(although studying it should assist any such journey). I will therefore turn 
now to an investigation of the channeling function's limitations. 
One limitation on the channeling function is that the state can rarely 
create a social institution de novo. Thus the channeling function can usually 
be deployed successfully only where an institution already exists. Nor can 
the state always bend an available institution to its purpose: As James 
Fitzjames Stephen said, "Legislation ought in all cases to be graduated to 
the existing level of morals in the time and country in which it is em-
ployed .... Law cannot be better than the nation in which it exists, though 
it may and can protect an acknowledged moral standard, and may gradually 
be increased in strictness as the standard rises. "43 Furthermore, channeling 
primarily works, as I have said, obliquely and interstitially. That is, it does 
not set all the terms of behavior within an institution but rather creates a 
system of incentives and disincentives that touch participants only in places, 
not globally. Even those incentives may operate so softly that many people 
are quite unaware of or indifferent to them.44 In short, because channeling 
often uses only indirect and moderate force, because it leaves so much to 
individual choice and to social rather than legal pressure, its power and 
utility are limited. 
In the last few decades, family law has been transformed,45 and perhaps 
the family has too. It is often said that families increasingly live in nontra-
ditional arrangements and that even when they don't their internal relations 
have vitally changed. Arland Thornton, for instance, sees a "decreased em-
phasis upon conformity to a set of behavioral standards in the family arena 
and an increased emphasis on individual freedom."46 In recent decades, 
more specifically, the divorce rate has risen impressively. There are more 
unmarried cohabitants. Nonmarital sexual activity has increased. Homosexu-
ality has lost some of its stigma. Single parents are more numerous. More 
broadly, one hears that "[f]amily groups are becoming internally deinstitu-
tionalized, that is, their individual members are more autonomous and less 
bound by the group[,] and the domestic group as a whole is less cohe-
sive .... Examples of this are the decline of economic interdependence be-
tween husband and wife and the weakening of parental authority over 
children."47 Are these changes so extensive that the family has become 
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"deinstitutionalized"? Has it grown unreasonable to speak of the family in 
terms of social institutions? Has the channeling function thus been put out 
of business in family law? 
Certainly family law has changed. "No-fault" divorce is now every-
where available, which both makes it easier to leave marriages and inhibits 
setting norms for marital behavior. Prohibitions on nonmarital sexual activ-
ity have largely been repealed, found unconstitutional, or fallen into desue-
tude. Laws disadvantaging illegitimate children have yielded to dissatisfied 
legislatures and courts. There has been some (partial) movement toward 
the "atomizing" of family law, toward seeing people not as family members, 
but rather as individuals dealing with other individuals.48 As Justice Brennan 
wrote in a telling and often retold phrase, "[l]f the right of privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free ... 
to bear or beget a child."49 By 1989, Justice Brennan could cite a string 
of cases he believed indicated that "we have declined to respect a State's 
notion, as manifested in its allocation of privileges and burdens, of what 
the family should be."50 
One noteworthy feature of recent legal change is the occasional govern-
mental recognition of "functional equivalents" of the family. Perhaps the 
best-known instance is Marvin v. Marvin. 51 There, the California Supreme 
Court invited cohabitants to arrange their affairs contractually and to invoke 
a broad set of equitable doctrines.52 Marvin may thus have given cohabitants 
marriagelike protections. Braschi v. Stahl Associates53 held that a homosex-
ual couple could be a "family" within the meaning of the New York City 
Rent and Eviction Regulations.54 In Moore v. East Cleveland, the United 
States Supreme Court decided that a grandmother living with a son and 
two grandchildren, one of whom was not the resident son's child, were a 
"family" for purposes of a constitutional challenge to a zoning ordinance.55 
And in Smith v. OFFER, the Court intimated that people employed by the 
state as foster parents might acquire a "parental" interest in their foster 
children strong enough to give them some of the constitutional rights of 
natural parents.56 To like effect are the occasional "domestic partner" ordi-
nances and regulations that seek to give spouselike benefits to unmarried 
cohabitants. 57 
Can the channeling function have any role in our changed new world? 
I believe so. I suspect that the larger purposes the channeling function 
serves are still important, even if the specific institutions the function pro-
motes may be altered somewhat. But in order to build an a fortiori case, 
let me revert to the two institutions I have used as examples-marriage 
and parenthood. I will readily grant that these institutions may well have 
changed in recent decades. But I will suggest reasons to doubt that even 
in the rather traditional terms in which I have described those institutions, 
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they can be dismissed as objects of the channeling function. Much less, 
then, can it be said that the family has been so thoroughly deinstitutionalized 
that the channeling function itself has become irrelevant. 
First, the world may not have changed quite so much and so simply 
as people-and courts-sometimes seem, rather casually, to assume. Social 
change is not often as monolithic and complete as we perceive it to be. 
For example, as early as 1964, that barometer of the conventional wisdom-
the cover of Time magazine-announced that America had undergone a 
"sexual revolution."58 This revolution was widely taken as having the most 
thoroughgoing proportions. But one particularly extensive and careful study 
of sexual attitudes conducted as late as 1970 concluded: "We have doubts 
that such a revolution occurred."59 That study's data demonstrated 
one striking fact: with regard to many forms of sexual expression, 
our respondents were extremely conservative .... A majority disap-
proved of homosexuality, prostitution, extramarital sex, and most forms 
of premarital sex .... Furthermore, except for masturbation and for pre-
marital sex between people who are in love, our data suggest that a 
majority of Americans are "moral absolutists" in that they see these 
behaviors as always wrong.60 
A more recent student concluded that the changes in sexual attitudes over 
the last several decades 
hardly amount to a Sexual Revolution. They are both smaller and 
more nuanced than aptly fits a revolutionary characteriza-
tion .... Notable increases in approval of premarital sex (including co-
habitation), sex education, and birth control did occur over the last 
generation. However, at least since the early 1970s there appears to 
have been no liberal shift, and even some conservative movement, in 
attitudes on homosexuality, extra-marital sex, and pornography.61 
Or take another example of the excessive simplicity of our impressions 
of social change. People commonly assume that "the family" is in a state 
of collapse, or at least lamentable disrepair. Yet, as David Popenoe notes, 
the "current view of many leading sociologists [is] that the family has not 
declined."62 Thus a recent contribution to the Middletown project looked 
at changes from the 1920s to the 1970s and "discovered increased family 
solidarity, a smaller generation gap, closer marital communication, more 
religion, and less mobility."63 
I am not arguing that society has not changed. Rather, I am suggesting 
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that we should be much more cautious than we usually are in approaching 
claims of radical social change and much more alive to the complexity of 
social life. For one thing, data are absurdly hard to acquire and analyze.64 
For another, social change is too often "proved" by arguments that the 
number of people doing something has increased by a large percentage. 
But the size of the percentage may be misleading where, as often happens, 
only a few people were involved at the first point in time.65 For yet another 
thing, it can be extremely difficult to distinguish short-term trends from 
genuine secular change. Further, impressions of social change are easily 
distorted. Both journalists and scholars, for instance, are more beguiled 
by the thrilling heterodox than the boring orthodox.66 And, for instance, 
we too easily see the behavior of our own class as typical of the country 
at large.67 
Even if social behavior has changed dramatically, social norms may 
not have. Even if, for example, families less often consist of a married 
couple and their biological offspring, that grouping may still represent a 
powerful cultural norm. Or, to take another example, it is often observed 
that "[m]ost divorced people remarry, usually soon after their divorces, 
suggesting that their divorce experience could be interpreted more as dissat-
isfaction with a specific spouse than as rejection of marriage as an institu-
tion."68 Further, many of the specific norms respecting marriage and parent-
hood could change without destroying the core institutional principles that 
I described earlier. I am not suggesting that there have been no changes 
in social attitudes about the family. But it seems to me quite possible that 
the social institutions I described earlier may still retain the social strength 
necessary to the channeling function even if they have changed in some 
respects and are statistically less common.69 
Even if social behavior and social norms are changing, will they con-
tinue to do so? Might they even reverse their course? As I once wrote, 
our views are "skewed by the unexamined assumption that change in social 
behavior (particularly change in family law matters) is unidirectional-that 
change will always liberalize social rules. Historically, ... this has not been 
true."70 And even if behavior and norms are changing in some places, they 
may not be in others. As I wrote, "[D]espite the many forces that impel 
the United States as a whole toward [social] descensus, there are probably 
still states and even regions in which traditional social norms are widely 
accepted."71 
Finally, even if behavior and norms are changing, society might wish 
to alter the direction of change. To be sure, any such attempt might be 
problematically overambitious. But there are inherent limits on a govem-
ment' s willingness and ability to make the channeling function work despite 
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an inadequate social basis for it. Without that basis, any such effort would 
have difficulty garnering the legislative will, the executive energy, or the 
popular support necessary to make it work. 
In sum, the channeling function's reach is always limited by the degree 
of social support the function's institutions receive. Today, marriage and 
parenthood appear to be changing institutions, and they appear to be under 
more pressure than they have been in recent memory. But this may mean 
no more than that these institutions are continuing to develop as they have 
been developing for centuries. That they are developing does not mean 
that their normative core will disappear. And even if it does, it seems 
likely that new institutions will have been created, so that the channeling 
function continues to do its work. In short, I doubt that so far, at least, the 
American family has become so deinstitutionalized that the channeling func-
tion is no longer useful or relevant to family law and thus to state-interest 
analysis. But this does not mean, of course, that every use of the function 
is constitutionally justifiable. What is needed, rather, is to ask case by case 
whether the channeling function can plausibly be said to work effectively. 
A second limitation of the channeling function is that its technique 
of promoting one institution by disadvantaging the alternatives can be troub-
ling. Where the alternative is immoral and socially harmful, this concern 
is, to be sure, much tempered. Originally many alternative institutions-
polygamy, adultery, fornication, and homosexuality, for instance-were gen-
erally condemned on these grounds. Thus it was considered fair not just 
to disadvantage them, but to criminalize them. As views on at least some 
of those subjects have changed, that response looks less satisfactory. But 
the problem is broader. Even if unmarried cohabitation, for example, is 
immoral, should it be discouraged by denying its practitioners the law's 
services in resolving their disputes? Doing so may in practice allow one 
miscreant actually to profit by taking advantage of another. And in at least 
one situation-illegitimacy-those who suffered most from the channeling 
function's operation-illegitimate children-were also those who were mor-
ally blameless. 
In thinking about this second limitation on the channeling function, 
we need to consider its complexity: Some ways of making an alternative 
institution less attractive are maximally coercive, as when they invoke crimi-
nal sanctions; others will hardly be coercive at all, as when they simply 
withhold the state's expression of approval. The costs of the technique 
importantly depend on the degree of coercion it employs. A sharp example 
of the more coercive end of the spectrum is prohibiting homosexual conduct. 
Such a prohibition not only invokes the law's strongest weapon-the crimi-
nal law. It also tends to exclude homosexuals from what the twentieth 
century considers a preeminent part of life-sexual relations. 
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On the other hand, ending the practice of disadvantaging competing 
institutions altogether would have its own costs. The channeling function 
helps tell the people involved in an institution, the world in general, and 
the law in particular that those people stand in a particular relation to each 
other. When people marry, they, the world, and the law know that they 
have assumed special obligations to each other. When a child is born in 
wedlock, the parents, the child (eventually), the world, and the law know 
that the parents have taken on special responsibilities to their child. "Func-
tional equivalence" approaches serve this end less well. 
Consider Marvin. Even had the legal principles established there al-
ready been undoubted law in California, Lee Marvin and Michelle Triola 
might still not have realized that their relationship had become so marriage-
like that they risked legal consequences when they separated. Nor could 
courts have known whether Marvin and Triola desired those consequences 
or whether they were, as Marvin claimed, trying to avoid them by not 
marrying. For the law to treat Marvin and Triola as a family, then, it had 
to inquire into their particular case. Each such inquiry has its social costs; 
together those costs may be nontrivial. Those costs are not only economic, 
although they are that too. For example, inquiries may intrude painfully 
into a couple's privacy, as Marvin indicates. First, Marvin requires courts 
to ask whether sexual relations are a severable part of the contractual consid-
eration. Second, it mandates a "searching inquiry" into whether the parties 
tried to avoid a marital relationship. Third, it demands a factual investigation 
into whether there was an express contract, an implied contract, a partner-
ship, a joint venture, or some other kind of understanding. Channeling 
institutions, then, set bright lines that establish for all concerned what peo-
ple's status is. They make it easier for people to predict the consequences 
of their acts. Further, they protect people from intrusive governmental in-
quiries. 
Like our discussion of the channeling function's first limitation, our 
discussion of the second must reach an equivocal conclusion. The technique 
of advantaging favored institutions ranges from hardly troubling to quite 
problematic, depending on the nature of behavior in the alternative institu-
tion and on how coercive the government's advantaging technique is. Once 
again, therefore, a case-by-case inquiry seems called for. 
Channeling's costs might more confidently be paid if its success could 
be better measured. But a third limitation on the function is the frustrating 
difficulty of such measurement. It is always hard to separate out either the 
law's effects on an institution from other effects on it or an institution's 
effects on behavior from all the other influences people respond to. We 
also need to know just what aspects of an institution have precisely what 
effects, so that we can rescue a defective institution with judicious changes 
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without junking its desirable aspects. Even could these measurement prob-
lems be overcome, we should still want to know what effects alternative 
institutions might have, and even crude evidence about them will often be 
elusive. And even if all these measurements could be made, how would 
we evaluate them? All significant social institutions are complex, all have 
defects, none wholly accomplish their goals. What standards should we 
use in choosing among imperfect institutions? 
The difficulty of measuring the channeling function's success in general 
or in any particular case is undeniable. But should it constitutionally pre-
clude the state from pursuing the channeling function? That function seeks 
to accomplish a complex set of broad social purposes, not simply to prevent 
one obvious harm to an identifiable person. Any such attempt will resist 
measurement. But that difficulty arises partly out of the very importance 
and ambition of the attempt. It seems perverse to say that the only interests 
the state may constitutionally advance for a statute are those so narrow 
that their effects may be accurately measured. No doubt the channeling 
function relies on unprovable assumptions. But "all schemes of statutory 
regulation are ultimately based on unprovable assumptions about human 
nature."72 Thus I would argue that the channeling function ought not be 
dismissed out of hand because measurement is difficult. Here once again, 
rather, the function needs to be evaluated case by case. 
Fourth, and crucially, channeling's worth in any particular instance 
will depend on the specific institutions it supports. Even if an institution 
serves the function's ends well, it must be evaluated in terms of all its 
social consequences. The law has supported institutions-pejoratively de-
scribed as the bourgeois family-which have hardly been universally ad-
mired over the last two centuries. In the nineteenth century the family was 
assailed as a prison by the Romantics and as an instrument of oppression 
by the Marxists. Today, it faces similar charges from the psychological 
left and from feminists. If those charges are correct, the law's channeling 
power was and is, pro tanto, badly used. 
Channeling can surely be misused, and people can reasonably disagree 
about what "misuse" means. However, this is not a reason for abandoning 
the function. For all the function's uncertainties and inadequacies, the goals 
it can be used to promote are important. Furthermore, the goals I have 
discussed are not the only ones channeling can promote. Channeling is 
not inherently confined to any single set of social ends. Rather, it may be 
recruited to serve whatever ends seem appropriate. 
For example, over the last several decades we have seen systematic 
and ambitious attempts to restructure marriage and parenthood in order to 
change the way people think and act regarding gender. Susan Okin, for 
example, urges channeling in this way by noting that the "way we divide 
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the labor and responsibilities in our personal lives seems to be one of those 
things that people should be free to work out for themselves, but because 
of its vast repercussions it belongs clearly within the scope of things that 
must be governed by principles of justice." She continues by arguing that 
"any just and fair solution to the urgent problem of women's and children's 
vulnerability must encourage and facilitate the equal sharing by men and 
women of paid and unpaid work, of productive and reproductive labor. 
We must work toward a future in which all will be likely to choose this 
mode of life. "73 
Many recent reforms of family law-made and proposed--can be un-
derstood in terms of a desire to employ the channeling function, to change 
the institutional basis of family life, in order to change gender relations 
in American society. For instance, no-fault divorce can be seen as freeing 
women from the bondage of unsatisfactory marriages. It has been hoped 
that equitable distribution can lead to a fairer distribution of marital assets 
than the common-law system of awarding property to the titleholder, partly 
on the reasoning that the titleholder is likelier to be the husband than the 
wife. Similarly, the category of assets divisible on divorce has been ex-
panded to include (in various ways) forms of wealth like pensions and 
professional degrees. Rehabilitative alimony has found favor over permanent 
alimony partly on the principle that the latter conduces to an undesirable 
dependence of women on men. Gender-neutral rules governing child cus-
tody have been urged in part on the ground that they can help establish 
the sense that fathers share with mothers responsibility for the daily care 
of their children. The Supreme Court has condemned gender roles in a 
variety of instances, saying that "[n]o longer is the female destined solely 
for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the 
marketplace and the world of ideas."74 Not only has abortion become a 
right, but the Court has ruled that that right is expressly a woman's, not 
a right she shares with her husband. Rules exempting husbands from the 
purview of rape laws have been eroded. Spouse abuse has begun to be 
prosecuted more vigorously. Antidiscrimination and affirmative-action rules 
have helped open jobs outside the home to women. Even the title by which 
married woman are addressed has been widely changed with a view to 
changing the way married woman are thought of and think of themselves. 
The reforms I have recited have had a variety of goals. Many of those 
goals are straightforward enough and have to do with directly ameliorating 
the condition of women in particular contexts. But a central purpose of 
these reforms can be understood to be altering the institutional situation 
in which men and women find themselves. I suspect that doing so is crucial 
if the larger goals that reformers ultimately want to reach are to be achieved. 
Those goals-which Okin describes as changing the "way we divide the 
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labor and responsibilities in our personal lives"-cannot readily be reached 
through direct legislation. Rather, social institutions must be structured so 
that "all will be likely to choose this mode of life." 
As I have tried to make clear, I have no doubt that the channeling 
function can be misused deplorably. But this essay has been animated in 
part by the belief that, at least among my likely readers, the faults of 
institutions have in recent decades received so much attention that their 
advantages are too little noted. It is worth recalling that we value institutions 
because they can promote goods that the state may legitimately prefer and 
promote. As I have suggested, the channeling function can be used to serve 
the (widely approved) protective, arbitral, and facilitative functions of family 
law. And as I have argued at some length, social institutions serve other 
functions that cannot easily be otherwise performed.75 
Some of my readers will feel that the channeling function is objection-
able because its effects must be systematically conservative. Leaving aside 
the question whether this is a legitimate constitutional objection, we may 
agree that there is something in the argument that social institutions are 
inherently conservative. Social institutions rest on attitudes that resist change 
because they are deeply ingrained and widely shared.76 However, this does 
not seem to me wholly bad, for reasons I have tried to suggest. Be that 
as it may, while social institutions may in important ways be inherently 
conservative, it would be wrong to see the channeling function in the same 
light. On the contrary, one of the most significant aspects of the function 
is exactly its reforming capacity. Because of their social strength, social 
institutions can be hard to change. There are few levers any person or 
even groups can press to exert real power directly on many institutions. 
The government, however, is specially-perhaps uniquely-well situated 
to try to change institutions that have come to seem unsatisfactory.77 As I 
wrote above, the channeling function may be and often is used to shape 
as well as sustain social institutions. 
In any event, in an important sense, one cannot abolish the channeling 
function in family law. Family law's goals-particularly those goals repre-
sented by the protective, arbitral, and facilitative functions-are so central 
that they are unlikely to be abandoned. As long as we pursue those goals, 
we will be creating, building on, and shaping social institutions and channel-
ing people into them. The most obvious way to try to escape doing so is 
by expanding the facilitative function, by turning family law into contract 
law. That venture could not entirely succeed, of course, if only because 
family law centrally involves children, and children (particularly the young 
children about whom we worry most) cannot make contracts. But even if 
the venture succeeded, it would create a new institution. Contract, after 
all, has its own social structures, its own assumptions, its own consequences. 
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Indeed, these are at the heart of the resistance to contract law's incursion 
into the sphere of family life. 
Channeling, then, cannot be escaped. It arises because we are social 
beings whose relations with those around us shape institutions that in turn 
shape us. It arises because we are imperfect people who without institutions 
behave in ways that injure our fellows.78 It arises because we see the faults 
of the institutions around us and seek to perfect them. Channeling, like 
any social tool, may be and has been used badly and used to bad purposes. 
But it is also one of the ways we try to use law to soften the harshness 
of life. 
Case Study: Michael H. v. Gerald D. 
I suggested at the beginning of this essay that courts and commentators 
have often been led astray by their failure to appreciate the way the law 
may be used to shape and sustain social institutions. I will now seek to 
instantiate that argument and to make my description of the channeling 
function more concrete by discussing a recent (and doctrinally consequen-
tial) case, the Supreme Court's opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D, a case 
I have chosen partly because many people find its state-interest aspect in-
comprehensible. 79 
In 1976, Gerald D. ("a top executive in a French oil company") married 
Carole D. ("an international model").80 In 1978, "Carole became involved 
in an adulterous affair with a neighbor, Michael H." In 1981, she had a 
child, Victoria D. "Gerald was listed as father on the birth certificate and 
has always held Victoria out to the world as his daughter." However, a 
blood test soon revealed "a 98.07% probability that Michael was Victoria's 
father." 
During the next three years, Victoria stayed with Carole, but Carole 
moved among the households of Gerald, Michael, and "yet another man, 
Scott K." We cannot tell just how much contact Michael had with Victoria 
during this period. Justice Scalia's plurality opinion speaks of "the relation-
ship established between a married woman, her lover and their child, during 
a three-month sojourn in St. Thomas, [and] during a subsequent 8-month 
period when, if he happened to be in Los Angeles, he stayed with her and 
the child."81 Justice Brennan's dissent said, "[T]he evidence is undisputed 
that Michael, Victoria, and Carole did live together as a family; that is, 
they shared the same household, Victoria called Michael 'Daddy,' Michael 
contributed to Victoria's support, and he is eager to continue his relationship 
with her."82 
So eager was Michael that he "filed a filiation action ... to establish 
his paternity and right to visitation." To cut a long and tumultuous story 
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short, "In June 1984, Carole reconciled with Gerald and joined him in New 
York, where they now live with Victoria and two other children since born 
into the marriage." Michael's filiation action encountered a California statute 
providing "that 'the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is 
not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the mar-
riage.' ... The presumption may be rebutted by blood tests, but only if a 
motion for such tests is made, within two years from the date of the child's 
birth, either by the husband or, if the natural father has filed an affidavit 
acknowledging paternity, by the wife."83 In 1985 the trial court rejected 
Michael's claim; in 1987 an appellate court affirmed and the California 
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 
In 1989 (when Victoria was roughly eight), the United States Supreme 
Court found the California statute constitutional. Michael, of course, had 
claimed a fundamental right to a relationship with Victoria and that the 
statute that barred his filiation action therefore had to be necessary to serve 
a compelling state interest. The plurality held that he had no such right, 
and it therefore did not reach the state-interest problem.84 Justice Brennan 
felt that Michael had such a right and therefore did reach that problem, 
but only dismissively.85 We, however, should find it useful to ask how the 
state's interests would look in light of the channeling function. 
In channeling terms, the state in Michael H. could be said to have 
two related "institutional" interests: first, an interest in preserving the stabil-
ity of marriage in general and the marriage between Gerald and Carole in 
particular. Second, an interest in the security of parenthood in general and 
of the relationship between Victoria and her presumptive parents in particu-
lar. Both these interests might be reasonably adduced in arguing against 
allowing Michael either parental rights or a hearing. 
A state exercising the channeling function may seek to strengthen the 
bond between husbands and wives, to promote the strength and stability 
of marriages. The constitutional legitimacy of that aim seems confirmed 
by the many cases praising a couple's constitutional interest in marriage. 
The state might well conclude that it would damage such relationships to 
require a couple to litigate with an outsider over the paternity of a child 
born to the wife during the marriage and to issue an official governmental 
announcement that that child was the wife's but not the husband's. The 
damage might come from several sources. If the husband did not know 
of his wife's affair and that "his" child was not his, he might feel the 
sharpest kind of pain. His reaction might be bitter and recriminating. The 
child might be a constant reminder of his wife's infidelity. It would hardly 
be surprising for him to contemplate divorce. 
Even if the husband al~eady knew of his wife's affair, their marriage 
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might still be banned by the kind of inquiry Michael sought. What couple 
would welcome such attention to their marriage and to the husband's cuck-
olded status? A core argument against fault-based divorce and applicable 
here is that couples ought not have to make a public display of their private 
lives. Even if devices like concealing the parties' names were used, spouses 
would still reveal themselves to everyone participating in the case. Quite 
apart from the injury to privacy, all litigation brings misery, and litigation 
over personal, especially intimate, subjects brings it abundantly. Such mis-
ery is unlikely to enhance the couple's marriage. Nor would it help to place 
the wife in the extremely awkward situation of recounting her betrayal of 
her marital· 1oyalties. And a judicial inquiry would commonly come at the 
worst time-when the affair had recently ended, the wife had returned to 
her husband, and they were trying to reconstruct their marriage and their 
family life. Nor is it easy to believe that, where the natural father won 
visitation rights, the couple's marriage would benefit from having to share 
childrearing with the wife's former lover. 
The California rule has several other attractions. An abandoned lover 
might be bitter, and the rule protects the reunited couple against merely 
malicious (even if factually well-founded) suits by a vengeful lover. And, 
of course, the lover's allegation might be false. The rule protects couples 
from having to resist such accusations. Finally, there would always be a 
small (roughly two percent) but not irrelevant chance that the blood test 
was inaccurate. 
A state using the channeling function may also want children to be 
raised in a stable home by two adults, each of whom is preferably the 
child's parent. Such a state might conclude that a child in Victoria's situ-
ation should have two parents who are fully and reliably hers. She cannot 
live with her two natural parents, but she has a natural mother who is 
married and that mother's husband is apparently willing to care and has 
been caring for her. The state might conclude from the social experience 
with children of divorce that, while it can be hard to be raised by two 
people on difficult terms who do not live together, it would be even worse 
to be brought up by three people, two of whom (the two men) have reason 
to be on hostile terms, two of whom (the mother and the lover) have reason 
to be on tense terms, and two of whom (the mother and the husband) 
have reason to be struggling to maintain a happy relationship. 
The dissent in Michael H. would presumably respond that the child's 
situation is secure because visitation would be ordered only if that were 
in the child's best interest. However, the state might reasonably conclude 
that the chances of visitation being in a child's best interests are small 
enough to justify a general ban on an inquiry. The state might also believe 
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what is often said, that findings about best interest are uncertain enough 
to make it wise to avoid such decisions when there are otherwise strong 
reasons for doing so. 86 
Further, Victoria's well-being and her relationship with Gerald and 
Carole, like their relationship with each other, might well be injured simply 
from having to endure a hearing. Like her parents, she has a privacy interest 
in avoiding the scrutiny a hearing is likely to inflict and an interest in 
escaping the misery of litigation. Further, the ability of Victoria's caretakers 
to be good parents and to maintain an untroubled relationship with her is 
likely to be injured by a hearing which so basically questioned the relation-
ships of everyone involved.87 Finally, until the hearing is concluded (and 
this litigation lasted something like seven years), the child would not know 
the status of her various parents. This is a kind (and length) of instability 
that is now widely deplored. 88 
In sum, California's rule can be seen as buttressing two institutions: 
a version of marriage and a view of parenthood. It does so by affecting 
entry into the latter institution, by refusing legal effect to some ways of 
entering parenthood. And it does so by restricting the forces that can im-
pinge on participants in both institutions. Finally, the rule may reaffirm in 
people's minds the social importance of marriage and its relationship with 
parenthood. 
Not atypically, the channeling function operates here by disadvantaging 
the "alternative institution" that Michael sought to create. It denied him 
the consolation of legally enforced contact with his child. I said earlier 
that this technique can be problematic. Is it here? 
Michael knew when he had the affair with Carole that she was married, 
and, given the operation of the channeling function and the social assump-
tions on which it relied, he knew that people commonly lack legal or even 
social rights in their married lovers' children. Further, the California statute 
put him on constructive notice that any child he had with Carole would 
legally be considered a child of her marriage (unless one spouse repudiated 
the child). More, the child was conceived in an adulterous relationship, a 
relationship Justices have said in dictum the state may make criminal. Fi-
nally, Michael probably knew that asserting a claim to the child could 
harm the marriage he had already damaged. If expectation has anything 
to do with parental rights, as the Court sometimes seems to say, and if his 
moral situation is as I have suggested, his claim to parental status does 
not look strong. 
Is all this enough to overcome whatever constitutional rights Michael 
can assert? Since I share the plurality's skepticism about those rights, and 
since I find the Court's state-interests tests too mysterious to apply intelligi-
bly,89 I cannot say. Nor have I considered other interests the state might 
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assert.9() But I do think that the channeling arguments are serious ones 
that should be among the factors weighed in any balancing of personal 
rights and state interests. 
Conclusion 
This essay argues that the Court has undervalued state interests in privacy 
cases. It suggests that the state's interests are richer, subtler, and more 
complex than the Court credits, and that statutes must be seen in light of 
their full legal and social context. This article has proposed that the state 
has an interest in helping to assure the existence of some kinds of social 
institutions and in helping to shape those institutions in beneficial ways. 
That interest will not always be present in a privacy case, it will not always 
be well served by a challenged statute, and it will not always be strong 
enough to overcome a claimant's right. But it can be part of what motivates 
states to adopt legislation and part of what justifies it. 
It may be that state-interest analysis as conventionally understood can-
not accommodate the channeling function. That would seem to me to re-
inforce the point with which I began this paper-that that analysis has 
been inadequate to its task. We hear a good deal about the Supreme Court's 
role as the country's conscience and about the indispensable "dialogue" 
over national issues that the Court is thought to conduct. But a wise con-
science and a full dialogue will accord all aspects of an issue their due. 
This conventional state-interest analysis has failed to do. 
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